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HE MILITARY INTERVENTION by the nineteen,member North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo, a province of Serbia in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was the first ofits kind undertaken by the alli,
ance. Under the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty,l NATO was formed as are,
gional security organization. With its mission to act in a defensive capacity to
protect its members from external aggression, under the treaty the parties spe,
cifically agreed that
an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall
be considered an attack against them all and consequently ... if such an armed
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective
self,defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use
of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 2

Thus, the intervention was arguably beyond NATO's intended mission.
Equally important, by unilaterally intervening in Kosovo, NATO bypassed the
United Nations. Its use of force clearly failed the test of strict compliance with
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the constraints of the UN Charter,3 for it did not seek prior authorization of the
Security Council to use force. Although the UN eventually assumed an impor~
tant role in shaping the future of Kosovo, it was invited to perform that task
only after the end of the conflict.4
I concede that it is too early to write a definitive commentary on the legal
implications of this intervention. Some tentative conclusions can, however, be
reached even at this time, which is a couple of months after Slobodan
Milosevic's acceptance of NATO's terms to end its air operations against Yu~
goslavia. These conclusions form the subject of this paper. In the next section, I
relate pertinent aspects of the armed conflict in Kosovo to provide the context
for the discussion that follows on the role of the United Nations in the conflict.
It is undoubtedly a laudable goal that the world community should effec~
tively respond to heinous crimes such as genocide in Rwanda and ethnic
cleansing, forced expulsions, and egregious violations of human rights in
Bosnia and Kosovo. But after NATO's intervention in Kosovo, the nature of
the response to such deprivations and the kind of precedent it sets are valid
questions because of their implications.
Air Operations by NATO and the Kosovo Peace Accord

Context. Arguably, the roots of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo go back hundreds
of years. 5 Although as a province of the Ottoman Empire Kosovo was ceded to
Serbia after Turkey's defeat in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the area is
regarded by Serbs as the cradle of their civilization, their cultural birthplace. It
was at the Battle ofKosovo in 1389 that the Serbs were defeated and ever since
they have painfully remembered the date. Also, many of their monasteries,
churches, and sacred places are in Kosovo.
The discussion here will, however, be confined to more recent events. A de~
cade ago, in 1988-1989, Yugoslavia and Serbia made constitutional changes
under which the special autonomy enjoyed by the Autonomous Province of
Kosovo under the 1974 constitution was revoked. That was the beginning of
Milosevic's repressive policies in Kosovo which eventually led to the current
crisis.
During 1998, violence spread with intensified attacks by ethnic Albanian re~
bels on Serbian military and police forces and a crackdown by these forces, "re~
sult[ing] in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and forc[ing] 400,000
people from their homes."6 Consequently, the concern grew that the violence
might spread into neighboring Macedonia and also draw Albania into the con~
flict, destabilizing the region. In May-June 1998, the North Atlantic Council
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held meetings on the Kosovo crisis at foreign and defense ministerial levels and
began considering a large number of possible military options. 7
Earlier, the so,called "contact group," composed of France, Germany, Italy,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, had begun attempts to
find a diplomatic solution to the conflict. In March 1998 the group proposed a
comprehensive arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including
Kosovo. 8 Also in March 1998, the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) convened a special session of its Permanent Council to
assess the deteriorating situation.9
After considering the reports of the contact group and the OSCE, the UN
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, resolved on March
31 to impose an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including
Kosovo. lO The Council also expressed "its support for an enhanced status for
Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and
meaningful self,administration," and accepted the contact group's proposal
that the Kosovo problem should be solved on the principle of the territorial in'
tegrity of Yugoslavia. 11
Furthermore, the Council condemned "the use of excessive force by Serbian
police forces against civilians'and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as
all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or indi,
vidual and all external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo, including fi,
nance, arms and training,"I2 and threatened additional measures in case of the
"failure to make constructive progress towards the peaceful resolution of the
situation in Kosovo."13 Yugoslavia, however, was insistent that under the UN
Charter the Kosovo situation was a matter solely within its domestic jurisdic,
tion.l 4
Subsequently, on September 23, 1998, the Security Council, again acting
under Chapter VII, adopted another resolution in light of the deteriorating hu,
manitarian situation. IS It called upon the parties to cease hostilities and "enter
immediately into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with inter,
national involvement, and to a clear timetable, leading to an end of the crisis
and to a negotiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo."I6 It demanded
that Yugoslavia "enable effective and continuous international monitoring in
Kosovo by the European Community Monitoring Mission and diplomatic mis,
sions accredited to the [State]"I7 and facilitate "the safe return of refugees and
displaced persons to their homes and allow free and unimpeded access for hu,
manitarian organizations and supplies to Kosovo."I8
On October 13, the NATO Council authorized Activation Orders for air
strikes I9 to be undertaken by NATO military forces within 96 hours as part of a
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phased air campaign in Yugoslavia 20 unless the parties agreed to implement the
terms of Security Council Resolution 1199 of September 23. However, within
the next three days successful diplomatic efforts resulted in Yugoslavia's agree,
ment with the OSCE for the establishment of a verification mission in
Kosovo ZI and another agreement between Yugoslavia and NATO providing
for the establishment of an air verification mission over Kosovo to complement
the OSCE verification mission.22 The United States also succeeded in diplo,
matic negotiations under which Yugoslavia agreed on a framework for a politi,
cal settlement of the conflict.23
Because of these developments and visits to Belgrade by NATO Secretary
General Javier Solana, U.S. envoys Richard Holbrooke and Christopher Hill,
and NATO Generals Claus Naumann and Wesley Clark, NATO called off the
air strikes. 24 Yugoslavia also agreed on limits on the number of Serbian forces
in Kosovo and on the scope of their operations.2 5
Acting again under Chapter VII, on October 24 the Security Council
adopted another resolution 26 reiterating the terms of the two earlier resolu,
tions, endorsing and supporting the verification agreements signed between
Yugoslavia and the OSCE and NATO, respectively, and demanding, inter alia,
that both the government of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanians "comply
fully and swiftly" with the terms of those resolutions and "cooperate fully" with
the OSCE and NATO verification missions.27 A special NATO military task
force was established to assist with emergency evacuation of Kosovo forces if
they were put at risk by renewed conflict; it was situated in Macedonia.
Subsequently, on November 12, the Secretary General reported to the Se,
curity Council that the October agreements had "contributed towards defusing
the immediate crisis situation in Kosovo and [had] created more favourable
conditions for a political settlement. "28 In his report, the Secretary General ad,
dressed the military, security, humanitarian and human rights situation in
Kosovo, and envisaged that the UN's role in Kosovo, "will focus on humanitar,
ian and human rights issues."Z9
Also through the Secretary General, the OSCE reported that its verification
mission would be composed of up to 2,000 unarmed verifiers and among the
mission's tasks would be "to supervise elections in Kosovo in order to ensure
their openness and fairness."30 Similarly, the Secretary General of NATO
noted in his October 27 letter to the UN Secretary General that the North At,
lantic Council had
decided to maintain the activation order for the limited air response on the
understanding that execution would be subject to a further Council decision and
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assessment that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not in substantial
compliance with Secutity Council Resolution 1199 (1998) ... [and had] also
decided to continue the present air activities as part of the phased air campaign) 1

The relatively optimistic picture presented by the UN Secretary General,
however, did not live up to its promise. As a result of mutual provocations and
increasingly excessive force being used by the Serbian military and Special Police against the Kosovar Albanians at the beginning of 1999, the situation was
worsening. Hence, the contact group met on January 29 and agreed that the
parties must come together for negotiations under international mediation.3 2
The urgency of the mandate was underlined by NATO's commitment to strike if
required. 33 The result was the first round of negotiations in Rambouillet, outside
Paris, from February 6 to 23, and a second round in Paris from March 15 to 18.
Under the proposed Rambouillet Accords,34 the basic principles of the
framework were the maintenance of territorial integrity of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and political autonomy for Kosovo.3 5 However, the term which
Yugoslav President Milosevic was unwilling to accept was the implementation
plan contemplating the establishment of a multinational military implementation force with NATO at its core.3 6 Another major difficulty was the provision
that after three years the mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo would be
determined by the convening of an international meeting primarily "on the basis of the will of the people"37 of Kosovo. This meant that ethnic Albanians,
constituting a 90 percent majority, would hold the key to Kosovo's future status. Ultimately, the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the proposed peace
agreement but the Serbs did not.3 8
The Serbian offensive against the ethnic Albanian Kosovars was immediately intensified with the Serbs defying their October agreement by moving
greater force into Kosovo. On March 20, its effectiveness having been blocked
by the Serbs, the OSeE verification mission withdrew, a last minute effort by
U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke to persuade Milosevic to sign the accords failed,
and on March 23 NATO's air campaign-"Operation Allied Force"-was
launched.3 9

Air Strikes Continue for Eleven Weeks. NATO Secretary General Javier
Solana stated the reason for ordering the strikes:
All efforts to achieve a negotiated political solution to the Kosovo crisis have
failed and no alternative is open but to take action. We are taking action
following the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia government's refusal of international
community demands: the acceptance of the interim political settlement, which
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has been negotiated at Rambouilletj full observance of limits on the Serb Army
and the special police forces, agreed on 25 Octoberj an end to the excessive and
disproportionate use of force in Kosovo. 40

In Solana's words, the objective of the air strikes was "to prevent more hu,
man suffering, more repression, more violence against the civilian population
ofKosovo ... [and] to prevent instability spreading in the region."41
NATO bombed Yugoslavia for eleven weeks. From the beginning, the at'
tacks consisted of missiles and smart bombs. Satellite,guided cruise missiles
were launched from ships and B,52s to knock out Yugoslavia's air defense sys,
terns, and smart bombs were dropped from aircraft, including F, ISs, F,16s and
the B,2 Stealth bomber.42
As the strikes began, President Bill Clinton justified the action in the follow,
ing terms:
Today we and our 18 NATO allies agreed to do what we said we would do, what
we must do to restore the peace. Our mission is clear: to demonstrate the
seriousness of NATO's purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand the
imperative of reversing coursej to deter an even bloodier offensive against
innocent civilians in Kosovoj and, if necessary, to seriously damage the Serbian
military's capacity to harm the people of Kosovo. In short, if President Milosevic
will not make peace, we will limit his ability to make war. 43

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was concerned that NATO had acted
without Security Council authorization. However, he blamed Yugoslavia's in,
transigence in repeatedly rejecting a diplomatic resolution of the conflict for
the air strikes. In his words,
I deeply regret that, in spite of all the efforts made by the international
community, the Yugoslav authorities have persisted in their rejection of a
political settlement, which would have halted the bloodshed in Kosovo and
secured an equitable peace for the population there. It is indeed tragic that
diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use of force may be legitimate
in the pursuit of peace.44

Three weeks into the air campaign, on April 13, General Clark summed up
the campaign's intent: "attack, disrupt, degrade, deter further Serb actions and
keep it going and further degrade Serb military potential. ... "45 He elaborated:
Weare operating on what I would call two axes of attack, or two lines of
operations: we are going after the forces inside Kosovo and around Kosovo to
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destroy these forces, to isolate them, to interdict them and to prevent a
continuation of their campaign or its intensification; and at the same time we are
going after an array of more strategic target sets that have to do with forces that
are possible to be used to reinforce bases of supply, the integrated air defense
system which protects the entire array of targets around the country, and also
higher level command and control, petroleum and many other factors here that
feed this military and security juggernaut that was assembled.46

In order to prevent hurting innocent civilians, causing so~called "collateral
damage," Clark added, "this campaign has the highest proportion of precision
weaponry that has ever been used in any air operation anywhere. We are going
after militarily significant targets and we are ... taking all possible measures to
avoid civilian damage."47
Civilian casualties continued to occur, however, because of errors as these
smart bombs would miss their targets. 48 To illustrate, General Clark went on to
explain how, because of bad weather, a NATO pilot engaged in mounting a re~
motely directed attack on a bridge struck a passing train, killing many passen~
gers.49
Calling the human cost of the war in Kosovo "unacceptably high," UN Sec~
retary General Kofi Annan issued a press statement on April 28 on the "deteri~
orating humanitarian situation" in Yugoslavia.50 He said,
The civilian death toll is rising, as is the number of displaced. There is increasing
devastation to the country's infrastructure, and huge damage to [Yugoslavia's]
economy. For example, Mr. Sommaruga [the President of the International
Committee of the Red Cross who recently visited there] told me that the
destruction of the three bridges in Novi Sad also cut off the fresh water supply to
half of that city's population of 90,000 people.51

According to an independent Serb study reported in the Sunday Times (Lon~
don) after the bombing had been halted, the air campaign had resulted in se~
vere damage to the Yugoslav economy-an estimated loss of $29 billion.52
This figure included $4.1 billion to the country's infrastructure, $2.77 billion in
damage to factories, oil refineries, and otherindustrial facilities, $270 million to
power plants, $355 million to the transportation system, and $2.3 billion in
"the human toll caused by deaths, injuries and unemployment."53 The bulk of
the cost, $23.2 billion, is the estimated loss to Yugoslavia's gross domestic prod~
uct over the next decade. 54
The cost of the war according to NATO, the United Nations, and other
sources, as reported by the Associated Press at the end of the conflict, was:
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35,219 sorties flown, resulting in the destruction of many targets, including 102
aircraft, over 400 artillery pieces, over 200 armored personnel carriers, over
100 tanks and 283 other military vehicles, and 16 command posts. 55 Estimates
of civilian casualties ranged from 2,000 to 5,000, and the number of refugees
was 855,000, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, while sev~
eral hundred thousand were displaced. 56
Later reports, based on investigations of the physical evidence of the results
of the bombing, showed that NATO's damage estimates to the Yugoslav army
were exaggerated, for the pilots had hit several clever decoys-dummy and de~
ception targets. 57 A UN team, the Inter~Agency Needs Assessment Mission,
sent in May to Yugoslavia by Secretary General Kofi Annan, reported to the
Security Council on June 9 that the air strikes had a "devastating impact" on
the environment, industry, employment, essential service and agriculture. 58
The mission team reported:
Damage to oil refineries, fuel dumps and chemical and fertilizer factories, as well
as the toxic smoke from huge fires and the leakage of harmful chemicals into the
soil and the water table have contributed to as yet unassessed environmental
pollution in some urban areas, which may in tum have a negative impact on
health and ecological systems. 59

According to subsequent reports, however, the earlier estimates of the mas~
sive pollution caused by the military campaign may have been overstated. 60
Also, a World Bank team assessing reconstruction needs in Kosovo reported,
on July 13, "significantly less damage to homes, power plants and roads than
thought"-at the lower end of the estimates that have ranged from $3 billion to
$5 billion over a three year period. 61

The Kosovo Peace Accords. The failure of the Rambouillet Conference, and
thus of diplomacy, led to NATO's bombing in Yugoslavia, and despite an
intensified bombing campaign, the war dragged on. Efforts at finding a political
solution, however, continued. 62 On May 6, the foreign ministers of the Group
of Eight, at their meeting in Bonn, Germany, agreed on a set of principles to
move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis. 63
These principles included an immediate and verifiable end to the violence
and repression in Kosovo; withdrawal from Kosovo of military police, police,
and paramilitary forces; effective international civil and security presences to
be deployed in Kosovo as endorsed and adopted by the United Nations; estab~
lishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the UN
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Security Council; the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons
and unimpeded access by humanitarian aid organizations to Kosovo; a political
process toward the establishment of an interim political framework agreement
providing for a substantial self,government for Kosovo based on the principles
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and the demilitarization of
the Kosovo Liberation Army; and a comprehensive approach to the economic
development and stabilization of the region. 64 Left vague were terms covering
the composition and the command of the peacekeeping force envisaged by the
Group of Eight.
Eventually, after protracted diplomatic negotiations, led primarily by Rus,
sian envoy and former Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin (who traveled to
Belgrade five times to talk with Milosevic) and NATO envoy President Martti
Ahtisaari of Finland, with the assistance of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott,65 a deal was struck between President Milosevic and NATO to
end the bombing. The Yugoslav Parliament accepted the peace document. 66
The prior principles announced by the Group of Eight formed the core of the
international proposal to end the Kosovo conflict, which was accepted by
Milosevic on June 3. 67 The major difference from the prior set of principles was
that now the international security presence to be deployed was to be "with
substantial NATO participation ... under unified command and control. "68 A
military, technical agreement was to be "rapidly concluded that would, among
other things, specify additional modalities including the roles and function of
Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo."69 Subsequently, after the foreign minis,
ters of the Group of Eight agreed on a draft Security Council resolution to end
the conflict, the Security Council resolved that the political solution to the
Kosovo crisis would be based on the General Principles earlier adopted by the
Group of Eight foreign ministersJo
NATO's Bypassing the United Nations and the UN Role after the
Bombing is Halted
The reason that the United States and NATO bypassed the United Nations
by not seeking authorization from the UN Security Council to use force was ob,
viously their fear and the near certainty that Russia and China would use their
veto power in the Council to block the action; both these permanent members
of the Security Council had strongly opposed the use of air strikes against
Yugoslavia.
As NATO's strikes began, the Security Council held an urgent meeting.
Calling the strikes a blatant violation of the United Nations Charter, some
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States condemned them as a unilateral use of force, while others justified them
on the ground that the action would prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in
Kosovo likely to result from Serbian attacks on Kosovar Albanians. 71 The Rus,
sian representative said that the Security Council "alone should decide the
means to maintain or restore international security," and that NATO's action
would set a dangerous precedent. 72 He further warned that "the virus of a uni,
lateral approach could spread," and that those who had initiated the military
venture "bore complete responsibility for its consequences."73
China's representative said that the NATO action "amounted to a blatant
violation of the United Nations Charter as well as the accepted norms in inter,
national law," and that the Chinese government strongly opposed the NATO
action. 74 He added that the Kosovo question should be solved by the people in
Kosovo, as it was an internal matter of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that
China "was opposed to the use of or the threat of use of force in international
affairs, or power politics of the 'strong bullying the weak,' " and that only the
Security Council could take such action, for it alone shouldered the primary re,
sponsibility for maintaining peace and security.75
The NATO action was strongly supported by the representatives of the
United States,76 United Kingdom,77 and Canada,7s among others. On March
26, the Security Council rejected a demand for the immediate cessation of the
use of force against Yugoslavia and the urgent resumption of negotiations, as
proposed in a draft resolution submitted by Belarus, Russian Federation, and
India. Only three countries-China, Namibia, and Russia-voted in favor,
while twelve voted against, with no abstentions,?9
Subsequently, on May 14, 1999, the Security Council adopted a resolution
inviting the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
other international humanitarian relief organizations to extend relief assis,
tance to the internally displaced persons in all parts of Yugoslavia, as well as to
other civilians being affected by the continuing crisis.sO The Council also em,
phasized that the humanitarian situation would "continue to deteriorate in the
absence of a political solution to the crisis consistent with the principles"
adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Group of Eight on May 6, and urged all
concerned to work towards that aim. S1
The vote to adopt the resolution was 13 in favor, with China and Russia ab,
staining. In explaining his country's abstention, the Chinese representative ex,
pressed his concern that the U.SAed NATO had launched military attacks
without the Security Council's authorization and, by bypassing the United Na,
tions, had created "the largest humanitarian disaster since the Second World
War."S2 He also said that
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NATO had brazenly attacked the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade with five missiles.
Three people in the Embassy had been killed and more than 20 injured. The
Embassy building had been severely damaged. Such a criminal act was a flagrant
encroachment on China's sovereignty and a serious violation of international
law and the norms governing international relations. As a victim, China had
every reason, on both moral and legal grounds, to demand that NATO stop
bombing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately and unconditionally.83

In explaining why his country could not support the text of the resolution,
the Russian representative said that "Russia had repeatedly warned against the
dire consequences created by NATO's illegal military actions. It was contin,
ued bombing that could lead to an escalation of the humanitarian tragedy-a
fact that was not reflected in the resolution. Narrow national interests had pre,
vailed over Charter obligations in the case of some Member States."84
Earlier, on May 8, the Security Council had met at the request of the govern,
ment of China, after the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was accidentally
bombed by NATO the preceding day.85 The Chinese representative read a
statement from his government that said:
Flagrant bombing by NATO, led by the United States, had already caused
enormous casualties and now it had gone so far as to bomb the Chinese Embassy.
That was a violation of the sovereignty of China, and of the basic norms of
international relations. China expressed the utmost indignation and severe
condemnation of this barbaric activity. It made the strongest protest. NATO,
headed by the United States, must assume the responsibility. China reserved the
right to take further measures.86

He added: "The frenzied bombardment by NATO, led by the United States,
of Yugoslavia over the last 45 days had resulted in civilian casualties. It had
now violated a mission. This was shocking. NATO should stop the air strikes
immediately and unconditionally."87 He was joined by the representative of
Russia expressing outrage "over the barbaric action," and calling for an imme,
diate halt to the strikes.88 The United States representative expressed his gov,
ernment's regrets and offered condolences to the Chinese Ambassador,89 and
was joined by several other representatives expressing their sympathy to China
and condolences to families of victims.90
Finally, after lengthy negotiations, the UN Security Council adopted a reso,
lution on June 10, 1999,91 under which the United Nations was called upon to
provide "international civil and security presences" in Kosovo.92 The Council
decided that the General Principles adopted by the G,8 Foreign Ministers on
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May 6, as further elaborated in the international proposal accepted by
Milosevic and the Yugoslav Parliament on June 3, would form the basis ofapolitical solution to the Kosovo crisis. 93
The Council demanded a "complete verifiable phased withdrawal from
Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in
Kosovo will be synchronized."94 It also requested the Secretary General to appoint "a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence," and for the Special Representative to "coordinate closely
with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate
towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner."95
The Council enumerated the responsibilities of the international security
presence which would include demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army
and establishment of a secure environment in Kosovo, "in which refugees and
displaced persons [could] return home in safety, the international civil presence [could] operate, a transitional administration [could] be established, and
humanitarian aid [could] be delivered."96
The Council authorized the Secretary General
to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an
interim administration [there] under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and which
[would] provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing
the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo. 97

This, indeed, was a tall order, and the Council detailed the main responsibilities of the international civil presence. These would include the promotion of
the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo,
performance of the basic civilian administrative functions for as long as required, the organization and overseeing of the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government and facilitation of a
political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status. Also included
were the support of the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction, protection and promotion of human rights, and maintenance of civil law and order, including establishing police forces. 98
After a slow start, the functions contemplated in the Council resolution are
being performed by the various actors. For example, the civilian and security
presences are in place, refugees have returned, and, although belatedly, the KLA
demilitarization is finally taking place. 99 However, the dreams of establishing
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democratic institutions in Kosovo and building a multiethnic, multicultural so'
ciety there are far from realization.
Yugoslavia's Request to the International Court ofJustice
for Provisional Measures
On April 29, 1999, Yugoslavia instituted proceedings before the Interna,
tional Court of Justice against Belgium "for violation of the obligation not to
use force."100 Similar claims were brought against nine other main NATO
countries: Canada,101 France,102 Germany,103 Italy,104 the Netherlands, 105
Portugal, 106 Spain, 107 the United Kingdom, 108 and the United States. 109 Yugo,
slavia based its claim on the UN Charter and several international legal con'
ventions, including the 1949 Geneva Convention and 1977 Additional
Protocol I, and the Genocide Convention. l1O It requested the Court to indi,
cate the following provisional measure: "The Kingdom of Belgium shall cease
immediately its acts of use of force and shall refrain from any act of threat or use
of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." 111
After holding public hearings between May 10 and 12, 1999, at which the
parties made oral presentations,112 the Court issued an Opinion on June 2 in
which it reflected, in its preambular paragraphs, on the use of force in Kosovo:
· .. Whereas the Court is deeply concerned with the human tragedy, the loss of
life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo which form the background of the
present dispute, and with the continuing loss of life and human suffering in all
parts ofYugoslaviaj
· . . \Vhereas the Court is profoundly concerned with the use of force in
Yugoslaviaj whereas under the present circumstances such use raises very serious
issues of internationallawj
· .. Whereas the Court is mindful of the purposes and principles of the United
Nations Charter and of its own responsibilities in the maintenance of peace and
security under the Charter and the Statute of the Court; [and]
· .. Whereas the Court deems it necessary to emphasize that all parties appearing
before it must act in conformity with their obligations under the United Nations
Charter and other rules ofinternationallaw, including humanitarian law.... 113

The Court indicated that, while it does not have to "finally satisfy itself that
it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case," it must ensure that "the provisions
invoked by the applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the
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jurisdiction of the Court might be established."l14 The Court noted that Yugoslavia's Declaration recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court "in all
disputes arising or which may arise" after the signing date,115 was deposited
with the Secretary General on April 26. Yugoslavia's contention was that, under its Declaration, the Court should consider all disputes effectively arising after April 25 . Specifically, it referred to bombing attacks that NATO had waged
on April 28, May 1, May 7, and May 8.
The Court, however, determined that, since the bombings in question had
begun on March 24 and had continued beyond April 25, the legal dispute between Yugoslavia and NATO member States arose "well before 25 April 1999
concerning the legality of those bombings as such, taken as a whole."116 It
added, "The fact that the bombings have continued after 25 April 1999 and
that the dispute concerning them has persisted since that date is not such as to
alter the date on which the dispute arose," and that "each individual air attack
could not have given rise to a separate subsequent dispute ... , [and] at this
stage of the proceedings, Yugoslavia has not established that new disputes, distinct from the initial one, have arisen between the Parties since 25 April 1999
in respect of subsequent situations or facts attributable to Belgium."117 Thus,
the Court concluded that it could not base its jurisdiction upon Yugoslavia's
Declaration and, by a vote of 12 to 4, rejected Yugoslavia's request for the indication of provisional measures. lIB
Also, the Court did not consider the provisions of the Genocide Convention
to be applicable since, under the Convention's definition of genocide at Article
II, the essential characteristic of the crime is the intended destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, and, in the Court's opinion, NATO
bombings did not entail the element of intent towards a group as such. II9
With minor variations, the Court also rejected Yugoslavia's claims against
other NATO members. 120 The determination was made on technical grounds
in some cases, such as that the United States had made reservations to Article
IX of the Genocide Convention, under which any dispute pertaining to the
Convention could be brought before the Court,121 and declarations of Spain 122
and the United Kingdom,123 under which no State accepting the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction could institute proceedings within twelve months after the filing of the Declaration.
Although the Court did not indicate any provisional measures requested by
Yugoslavia, it did state that its findings "in no way prejudge the question of the
jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits of the case or any questions relating to the admissibility of the Application, or relating to the merits themselves."124 The Court also asked the parties to "take care not to aggravate or
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extend the dispute," for it had not passed judgment on the question of "the
compatibility of particular acts with international law," a question that could
be reached only when the Court addressed the merits after having established
its jurisdiction and heard legal arguments by all parties. 125 The Court added
that, whether States accept or reject its jurisdiction, "they remain in any event
responsible for acts attributable to them that violate international law, including humanitarian law," and that "any disputes relating to the legality of such
acts are required to be resolved by peaceful means, the choice of which ... is
left to the parties."126
Thus, although the Court refused to pass judgment on the legality of
NATO's offensive in the absence of an authorizing UN Security Council resolution, it unequivocally expressed its concern about the use of force and the human suffering and loss of life in Kosovo.
Analysis

NATO's Flawed Operation. NATO's operation was flawed from the outset)27
Costly miscalculations had led the alliance to begin air strikes.l28 The
assumption that NATO's threat of bombing would force Milosevic to back
down, and that, in any event, he would not be able to withstand more than two
to four days of air strikes, was subsequently proven false. After the failure of
Rambouillet, NATO perceived its credibility to be at stake, especially as its
fiftieth anniversary was so close at hand. And as the war dragged on, NATO
intensified its attacks, severely damaging Serbia's infrastructure, ruining its
economy, and causing numerous civilian casualties.
Also from the outset, the United States and NATO had sent a clear signal to
Milosevic that they would not use ground forces. Without the use of ground
forces against Serbia, Milosevic appropriately reasoned that he could withstand
NATO's attacks. Given the importance of Kosovo to the Serbs, it was foolhardy for NATO to assume that Milosevic would quit Kosovo without much
resistance, as he had earlier done in Krajina when the Croat~ cleansed the area
of Serbs, apparently with western complicity.
To go back to the Rambouillet Conference, it was again flawed thinking on
the part of NATO that Milosevic could accept the take-it-or-leave-it proposition, an integral part ofRambouillet, that the agreement on Kosovo's constitution was simply an interim measure, allowing the final status to be determined
in three years when the people of Kosovo would finally decide their future. It
was easy for any observer to understand what the provision meant-independence for Kosovo in three years, which Milosevic could not accept. Similarly, for
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Rambouillet to impose an international force, more or less as an occupying
force in Yugoslavia, to keep the peace in Kosovo was surely unacceptable to the
Serbs.
And finally, the NATO operation miserably failed to accomplish its twin
missions-one, to protect Kosovar Albanians from the excessive use of force by
Serbs, and two, to prevent destabilization of the Balkan region. Instead,
Milosevic intensified the ethnic cleansing being waged against the Kosovars.
The outcome was that villages were burned, homes destroyed, and thousands
of Kosovar Albanians murdered. Over 800,000 ethnic Albanians fled Kosovo
into Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and abroad, and hundreds of thou,
sands were displaced within Kosovo. And the region was troubled-Macedo,
nia and Albania bursting with refugees and other neighboring countries feeling
the economic pain caused by the devastation of Yugoslavia. Thus, political and
economic stability was a further casualty of the operation.

NATO's Actions in Kosovo Required UN Authorization. Article 2, paragraph
4 of the UN Charter explicitly prohibits the use of force in international
relations. 129 The only exceptions are: action taken by the Security Council
under Chapter VII, 130 regional actions under Chapter VIII, 131 and unilateral or
collective self,defense measures under Article 51. 132 A regional body may
legitimately use for~e only pursuant to prior authorization by the Security
Council.133 Even if NATO, a regional security organization, could have
justified its offensive on moral grounds, that is, in response to the gross
violation of Kosovar Albanians' human rights, it did not seek prior
authorization because of the certainty of the Russian and Chinese vetoes, for
these two permanent members of the Council had openly opposed NATO
bombings of Yugoslavia.
The bypassing of the United Nations has not set a healthy precedent. As
Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his address to the General Assembly on Sep,
tember 20, 1999, said, "While the genocide in Rwanda will define for our gen,
eration the consequences of inaction in the face of mass murder, the more
recent conflict in Kosovo has prompted important questions about the conse,
quences of action in the absence of complete unity on the part of the interna,
tional community."134
Annan presented the dilemma faced by the international community in the
Kosovo situation, that is, its inability to reconcile the question of legitimacy of
intervention by a regional organization without the Council's authorization on
the one hand, and the effective halting of gross and systematic violations ofhu,
man rights-a universally accepted imperative-on the other. 135 This, he said,
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can only be viewed as a tragedy and is likely to present a "core challenge" to the
Security Council in the next century: how to forge unity behind the principle
that massive, systematic violations of human rights should not be allowed to
happen anywhere. 136
The Secretary General provocatively asked those who hailed the NATO
military action in Kosovo as the heralding of a new era when States and groups
of States can take military action without prior Council authorization, that is,
"outside the established mechanisms for enforcing international law": "Is there
not a danger of such interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient se~
curity system created after the Second World War, and of setting dangerous
precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide who
might invoke these precedents and in what circumstances?"137
In his address to the General Assembly the day following the Secretary Gen~
eral's, President Clinton defended NATO's action in Kosovo, saying it "had
followed a clear consensus expressed in several Security Council resolutions:
that the atrocities committed by Serb forces were unacceptable, that the inter~
national community had a compelling interest in seeing them end." 138 He said
that had NATO chosen to do nothing in the face of this brutality in Kosovo, it
would not have strengthened the United Nations, but instead, "we would have
risked discrediting everything the United Nations stands for."139 He added:
By acting as we did, we helped to vindicate the principles and purposes of the UN
Charter, to give the UN the opportunity it now has to play the central role in
shaping Kosovo's future. In the real world, principles often collide and tough
choices must be made. The outcome in Kosovo is hopeful.l 40

The norms stated in Article 39 of the UN Charter authorizing the use of
force only when the Security Council determines that there has been a threat
to or breach of the peace or act of aggression 141 were fashioned at the end of the
Second World War and in the era of interstate conflicts. Since most contem~
porary conflicts leading to violence are likely to be intrastate and not interstate,
have these norms become too restrictive and hence outdated? Professor Mi~
chael Glennon has recently suggested that the old UN rules on peacekeeping
and peacemaking, premised on Article 2, paragraph 7's prohibition against in~
tervention in "domestic" matters, are dead and that their death "should not be
mourned."142 Although he decries ad hoc approaches, he says that in Kosovo,
justice and the UN Charter seemed to collide, and that new international rules
are emerging.
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Is it a collision of principles that we are witnessing, and are the UN norms
being replaced with newly emerging norms to meet the needs of the time? Prin,
ciples do often collide, and, as Professor Glennon reflects, the imperative to
halt gross violations of human rights and the doctrines of sovereign equality
and non,interference in internal affairs are seemingly irreconcilable. But that
does not mean that the existing Charter norms are unworkable and are being
replaced by new norms.
As I have earlier argued, by interpreting Article 2(4) broadly and giving due
consideration to the human rights provisions in the Charter and to the impres,
sive array of human rights norms developed in the last half,century, one can
make a strong case that the UN Charter does leave room for armed humanitar,
ian intervention. 143 Thus, my contention has been that when the UN is un,
willing or unable to act, as happened in Rwanda, a regional organization or
even a group of States could have validly intervened to halt the tragedy of
genocide that occurred there. This contention, however, does not signify the
demise of the "antiquated" rules of the United Nations Charter, nor the emer,
gence of new rules. Nor does it endorse unconstrained regional action on the
model of NATO's bombings in Yugoslavia.
It should, however, be noted that at the end of the bombing campaign,
NATO did appropriately tum to the United Nations, and, as mentioned ear'
lier, Security Council Resolution 1244 explicitly stated that the deployment of
international civil and security presences in Kosovo is to be under UN au5'
pices. 144 To reiterate President Clinton's words, NATO acted "to give the UN
the opportunity it now has to play the central role in shaping Kosovo's fll'
ture."145
In his General Assembly address, Secretary General Annan reminded the
Assembly of the Preamble of the UN Charter, which states that "armed force
shall not be used, save in the common interest."146 He emphasized that under
the Charter the Security Council is required to be the defender of the "com'
mon interest,"147 and that ~ member States should find a way to find com'
mon ground in upholding the Charter principles and acting in defense of that
common interest. He said that the choice must not be between Council unity
and inaction in the face of genocide, as happened in Rwanda, and Council divi,
sion and regional action, as happened in Kosovo.1 48
It is indeed lamentable that the Security Council could not find a way
through preventive diplomacy or preventive action, such as sending several
thousand more OSCE monitors into Kosovo, to avert the NATO military ac,
tion. The Rambouillet Accord, as a special example, was so greatly tilted
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against the Serbs that they could not have been expected to accept its terms,
and there was no opportunity accorded to them for revision of the document.

Tr t would have been preferable for the UN have undertaken armed inter~
Jl vention when it became necessary in Kosovo. However, as NATO began
to

the air campaign, its action was ill~conceived and poorly planned. On legal
grounds, though, it still did not meet the criteria outlined earlier for unilateral
or regional humanitarian intervention actions. I49 These criteria, as applicable
here, are necessity, proportionality, and maximization of the best outcome.
One can argue that the necessity criterion was met. As to the other factors,
there remains a valid question whether the intense bombing of Serbia, espe~
cially that of the infrastructure and civilian targets, was proportional; it was
perhaps excessive. The most questionable aspect, however, is that the proba~
ble humanitarian impact of the air campaign was never adequately considered.
To reiterate, the use of ground forces was rejected at the outset; Milosevic's de~
termination was grossly underestimated; and the likely intensification of ethnic
cleansing by the Serbs after the air strikes would begin was practically ignored.
And with the ethnic cleansing having also occurred in reverse after the end of
the bombing and the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo,I50 as most Serbs
have left Kosovo under pressure from the Kosovars, the outcome has not been
the establishment of a multiethnic society in Kosovo, an express objective of the
campaign. Under any objective criteria, the NATO action is hard to justify.
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